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Introduction. 
The late Eric Hobsbawm famously remarked ‘whoever says Industrial 
Revolution says cotton’.2 But what was cotton? Like our English-speaking 
predecessors of the 18th century, historians find the English words ‘cotton’ and 
‘cottons’ convenient labels for the huge diversity of textiles which have incorporated 
fibres from the fruit of the cotton plant. Yet until the very end of the 18th century, the 
vast majority of the ‘cottons’ manufactured in western Europe consisted only partly 
of cotton fibre, if at all. Many consisted of mixtures of cotton yarns with linen (flax or 
hemp) yarns, in various proportions. Some combined cotton with silk yarns, or 
woolen yarns, or worsted yarns. One type of heavily napped woolen cloth, woven in 
Wales and north-west England, was known as ‘cotton’, but contained no cotton fibre 
whatsoever. This ambiguity explains the tautology in a 1776 letter from a 
Bedfordshire gentlewoman to a friend in London asking her to buy a piece of printed 
cotton fabric. Writing just three years after cotton yarn from Richard Arkwright’s new 
spinning machines first began to be woven into all-cotton British calico, she was 
obliged to distinguish between the new printed fabric, woven wholly from cotton 
yarn, and printed fabric made from the established combination of cotton weft and 
linen warp. She wanted the newer, all-cotton variety, but finding the appropriate 
vocabulary to distinguish the one from the other was evidently a challenge. She 
asked for a printed cotton ‘of the new manufactory which are Cotten both ways,’ but 
then continued, somewhat confusingly, ‘it is a great deal lighter than a Cotton, and 
the colours look more lively.3 
 Scrutiny of material differences between the various ‘cottons’ is not simply a 
matter of remedying taxonomic confusion. These differences were crucial for the 
timing and technological trajectory of the British Industrial Revolution in textiles. It is 
the materiality of ‘cotton’ textiles that is the focus of this paper. The paper is divided 
into four sections. The first reviews recent interpretations of the British Industrial 
Revolution in textiles. The second evaluates the evidence for economic 
inducements to innovation. The third examines demand for the various ‘cottons’, a 
key issue ignored in the leading interpretations. In conclusion, the fourth section 
considers the implications of demand for our understanding of technical innovation 
in spinning. 
 
 
  
                                               
2 Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Birth of the Industrial Revolution, London 1968: 34. 
3 Bedfordshire and Luton Archives and Record Service, M10/4/34: Williamson Muniments, 
correspondence, letters to Mary Williamson, 1775-8, Margaret Cater, Kempston Greys, Bedfordshire, 
to Mrs. Mary Williamson, London, 17 October 1776. 
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1. Explaining technical innovation. 
Traditional accounts of the British Industrial Revolution tell the story of an Asian 
textile – cotton – transformed into a cheap, mass-produced British staple by means 
of cost-cutting mechanical inventions. Indeed, technology was centre stage in 
Adolphe Blanqui’s 1837 Histoire de l’Économie Politique en Europe, the book which 
offered one of the first systematic applications of the term ‘industrial revolution’. 
Blanqui insisted that Britain had recently undergone an economic revolution 
comparable to the social and political revolution experienced in France. In a chapter 
entitled ‘On the economic revolution in England caused by the discoveries of Watt 
and Arkwright’, he defined that economic revolution in terms of technology, or, to be 
more precise, in terms of just two machines:  
 
Two machines, henceforth immortal, the steam engine and the 
spinning machine, overturned the old commercial system and, 
almost at the same moment, gave birth to material products and 
social questions unknown to our fathers … Hatched in the brains of 
Watt and Arkwright, two men of genius, the industrial revolution took 
possession of England.4 
 
 Recent quantitative studies of the classic period of the British Industrial 
Revolution from 1760 to 1830, couched in national accounting terms, have 
suggested that overall rates of economic growth were significantly lower than had 
previously been assumed. Yet despite the tendency to downplay the significance of 
Industrial Revolution for the economy as a whole, economic historians continue to 
foreground those technological innovations on which the very notion of Industrial 
Revolution was originally founded. They do so with good reason, because the three 
transformative inventions in cotton spinning were made in Lancashire in a period of 
just twenty years from 1760 to 1780. Within another fifteen years, by 1795, they had 
been applied to the four other principal spun fibres – short-staple wool, long-staple 
wool, flax, and spun silk. There is room for debate about how much these inventions 
revolutionized the British economy as a whole, but for the industries concerned, the 
effects were rapid and transformative. 
 The question of why the crucial technological innovations were British is 
central to the two most recent (and influential) general treatments of the Industrial 
Revolution – Joel Mokyr’s The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of 
                                               
4 Adolphe Blanqui, Histoire de l’Économie Politique en Europe, Vol. 1, Paris, 1837: 207 and 209. 
Blanqui offers an exceptionally stark account of the transformative impact of technology, but it was 
rooted in the concept of industrial revolution first developed by his patron, Jean-Baptist Say, in his 
Cours Complet d’Economie Politique Pratique (Paris, 1828), vol. 1: ch. 19. For Blanqui, Say and the 
origins of the term ‘Industrial Revolution’, see Gareth Stedman Jones, ‘Industrie, pauperism and the 
Hanoverian state: the genesis and political context of the original debate about the “Industrial 
Revolution” in England and France, 1815-1840’ (Working Paper, Centre for History and Economics, 
Cambridge, 1997). 
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Britain, 1700-1850 and Robert Allen’s The British Industrial Revolution in Global 
Perspective.5 Both books employ a distinction between micro- and macro-
inventions, identifying James Hargreaves’ spinning jenny of 1764-6 and Richard 
Arkwright’s water frame, patented in 1769, as key macro-inventions in cotton 
spinning, along with Samuel Crompton’s later spinning mule of 1779 which 
integrated the principles of the first two machines. However, the two books provide 
very different approaches to explaining macro-invention. 
 Mokyr insists that macro-inventions (in contrast to micro-inventions) are only 
very weakly related to economic forces, if at all. He presents macro-inventions as 
radical new ideas that emerge without clear precedent, but have dramatic economic 
consequences.6 The roots of the key macro-inventions of the British Industrial 
Revolution, insists Mokyr, lay in what he calls ‘the great synergy of the 
Enlightenment: the combination of the Baconian program in useful knowledge and 
the recognition that better institutions created better incentives’.7 In other words, 
their origins were cultural, intellectual and institutional – they are to be found in a 
distinctively British combination of competitive markets and scientific research 
linked to practical applications. Mokyr’s broad emphasis on the importance of 
‘useful knowledge’ is unexceptionable, but in the process he appears to abandon 
the possibility of explaining the origins of particular macro-inventions, while 
sidelining evidence for pre-Enlightenment inventiveness.  
 Robert Allen, by contrast, offers an explanation for the key macro-inventions 
that is narrowly economic, rooted in the theory of induced innovation. He insists that 
technological change is directed by the relative prices of the factors of production. 
Eighteenth-century Britain was, he argues, an economy characterized by high 
wages, but cheap capital and very cheap energy, which rendered worthwhile the 
high costs of developing labour-saving macro-inventions and converting them into 
commercially useful technologies. To apply this approach to technical innovation in 
textiles, Allen focuses not on Richard Arkwright’s water frame, but on James 
Hargreaves’ spinning jenny, invented in Oswaldtwistle, Lancashire in the mid-
1760s, which he characterizes as ‘the Industrial Revolution in miniature’. In his book 
and an associated article, Allen offers a heroic cliometric comparison of the jenny’s 
potential to reduce spinning costs in Britain, France and India.8 He concludes the 
jenny more than paid for itself given high British wages for hand spinning and 
                                               
5 Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1850, New Haven 
and London, 2010; Robert Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cambridge, 
2009. 
6 Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, Oxford, 1990, 
13. 
7 Mokyr, Enlightened Economy, 122. 
8 Robert Allen, ‘The Industrial Revolution in Miniature: The Spinning Jenny in Britain, France, and 
India’, Journal of Economic History, 69, 2009: 901-927. The precise date of Hargreaves’ invention is 
uncertain. In 1822 Hargreaves’ daughter dated it to ‘the year 1766 or thereabouts’; quoted in 
Christopher Aspin, ‘New Evidence on James Hargreaves and the Spinning Jenny,’ Textile History, 1 
(1968), 120. 
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relatively low British capital costs. It was not economically advantageous in France, 
where spinning wages were lower and the cost of capital higher, and it was certainly 
not viable in India, where wages were lower still and capital costs even higher.  
 Allen’s quantitative analysis has been subjected to technical criticism, 
questioning the leisure-preference assumptions built into his calculations.9 A more 
extensive critique of his insistence that hand spinning shared in a distinctively 
British high wage economy is offered by Jane Humphries and Ben Schneider.10 
They argue that earnings from spinning, which was performed overwhelmingly by 
women and children on a putting-out basis, were substantially lower than Allen 
claims and underwent no substantial increase in the course of the eighteenth 
century. ‘Substituting inexpensive capital for high wages’, they suggest, ‘was not the 
driving incentive behind the crucial inventions in this key sector.’11 Rather, they see 
technical innovation in spinning as a reaction to bottlenecks in the supply of yarn 
resulting from the low productivity of hand spinning and to the inconsistent quality of 
hand-spun yarn. The new technologies addressed these problems, while continuing 
to take advantage of low-paid female and child labour. For Humphries and 
Schneider, technical innovation was driven by low, not high wages. 
  
 
  
                                               
9 See Gragnolati, U., D. Moschella, and E. Pugliese, ‘The Spinning Jenny and the Industrial 
Revolution: A Reappraisal’, Journal of Economic History, 71, 2011: 458-63. For Robert Allen’s reply, 
see his ‘The Spinning Jenny: A Fresh Look’, ibid: 461-4. 
10 J. Humphries, ‘The lure of aggregates and the pitfalls of the patriarchal perspective: a critique of 
the high wage economy interpretation of the British industrial revolution’, Economic History Review, 
66, 2013: 693-714; J. Humphries and B. Schneider, ‘Spinning the Industrial Revolution’, University of 
Oxford, Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, vol. 145, 2016. 
11 Humphries and Schneider, ‘Spinning the Industrial Revolution’: 38. 
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2. Spinning wages: high or low? 
Robert Allen insists changes in relative prices of the different factors of production 
can explain the timing of macro-inventions. Given his characterization of eighteenth-
century Britain as a high wage economy, it is the price of labour that is key here. Yet 
insofar as Allen uses spinning wages to explain the timing of the invention of the 
spinning jenny, it is in terms of centuries rather than years, or even decades. He 
offers only six of estimates for real English spinning wages between the 1580s and 
the 1760s, all but one drawn from estimates by contemporary commentators and 
none of them for spinning cotton.12 On the basis of this evidence, he concludes that 
‘a woman earned one-third as much as a man at the end of the sixteenth century or 
in the first half of the seventeenth. By 1750 her earnings had jumped to two-thirds of 
male earnings. These earnings were very high compared to those in other 
countries.’13  
 Allen’s use of evidence is defective in several ways. His international 
comparison relies principally on wage data for French spinning derived from Arthur 
Young, the English agricultural writer who toured France in 1787-9. Oddly, Allen’s 
references are not to Young’s own book, Travels during the Years 1787, 1788, and 
1789, published shortly after his return to England, but to Constantia Maxwell’s 
collection of extracts from it, first published in 1929.14 Nor does Allen reference the 
wages Young reported for cotton spinning, but rather Young’s averaging of all his 
observations of spinning earnings across France, including the spinning of flax, 
hemp, coarse wool, and fine wool, which often paid far less than spinning cotton, 
especially in remote, mountainous areas in south-central France. Young recorded 
relatively few observations for cotton spinning wages in France. Those he did report 
were mainly for Normandy, in the eighteenth century France’s counterpart to 
Lancashire for cotton manufacturing. Country spinners near Le Havre earned 16 
sous per day, at Yvetot in the Caux 12 sous per day, at Rouen, described by Young 
as ‘the Manchester of France’, 8 to 12 sous per day, while good cotton spinners at 
La Roche-Guyon, to the south-east on the edge of the Normandy cotton spinning 
zone, earned 12 to 15 sous per day. Only at Angers, in Anjou nearly 200 miles to 
the south-west, did he report lower rates for spinning cotton of 5 to 8 sous per day.15 
The average of 13 sous per day he recorded for cotton spinning in Normandy 
                                               
12 R. Allen, ‘The high wage economy and the industrial revolution: a restatement’, Economic History 
Review, 68, 2015: 14-15. Allen’s data for these years is drawn from C. Muldrew, ‘“Th’ ancient Distaff” 
and “Whirling Spindle”: measuring the contribution of spinning to household earnings and the 
national economy in England, 1550–1770’, Economic History Review, 65, 2012: 504-11, 519.  
13 Allen, ‘The high wage economy and the industrial revolution: a restatement’: 15. 
14 Arthur Young, Travels during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789, first edition, Bury St Edmunds 
1792: 503; Arthur Young, Travels in France during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789, ed. Constantia 
Maxwell, Cambridge 1950: 311. For the detailed exposition of this aspect of Allen’s argument, see 
Allen, ‘Industrial Revolution in Miniature’: 910. 
15 Arthur Young, Travels during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789, second edition, Vol. 1, London, 
1794: 550, 562-5. The second edition provides a table on earnings in manufacturing, not included in 
the first edition, which specifies spinning wage rates for different areas. 
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represented about 7d. a day in English money. 7d. per day is in the middle of the 4d. 
to 10d. a day (assuming a six-day week) Young had previously recorded at 
Manchester in 1771.16 So it is not clear from Young’s data that there was any 
difference in nominal wages for hand cotton spinning between the key cotton 
manufacturing districts in England and France during the years jennies were being 
introduced. Even if adjusted for the differential identified by Allen in the costs of 
living in France and England, it is unlikely that his extremely stark real wage 
differentials would hold. If Normandy is the appropriate French comparator, the 
price of spinning labour in Lancashire does not appear to have been relatively high 
at all. 
 Humphries and Schneider’s analysis is grounded in a much more thorough 
exploration of the English evidence than Allen’s. They construct an impressively 
large new dataset of spinners’ earnings based on primary sources, covering the 
period from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. Manuscript records 
of output actually achieved and wages actually paid are compared with the 
estimates published by contemporary élite commentators, previously historians’ 
main source for spinners’ work and earnings. Actual output and actual earnings are 
shown to have been substantially lower than those recorded by the commentators. 
This finding is then used to develop a critique of Allen’s argument that spinning 
provided substantial improvements in women’s (and families’) real earnings over the 
period. Their new data suggests women’s earnings from spinning were modest and 
any increase between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries was small, at best. 
In other words, there was no spike in spinning wages in the middle decades of the 
eighteenth century to induce the invention of the spinning jenny in the 1760s, as 
opposed to a half-century or a century earlier.  
 Nevertheless, as a contribution to the debate around induced innovation in 
eighteenth-century cotton textiles, the Humphries-Schneider dataset suffers from its 
own shortcomings. Most obviously, their dataset contains very few observations for 
spinning cotton before the mid-1760s, and none for cotton spinning in Lancashire 
(something also lacking in Allen’s work). Indeed the whole dataset is biased towards 
the spinning of wool in the southern half of England. Yet there was considerable 
divergence in the fortunes of England’s textile industries in the eighteenth century, 
by region and by fibre. There is no reason to believe that the wages paid for 
spinning yarn for wool-worsted serges in Devon, or for woolen broadcloth in 
Wiltshire followed the same trajectory as those for Lancashire cottons.  
 Moreover, Humphries and Schneider take little or no account of the count (ie. 
the fineness) of the yarn spun. This is a significant omission, because piece rates 
                                               
16 Arthur Young, A Six Months Tour through the North of England, Vol. 3, London 1770: 248. The 
exchange rate used here is 31.5d. per Écu, which would have been characteristic of the early 1770s; 
see John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook, 
London, 1978: 97. 
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varied according to the count. For cotton, it was reported that in 1743 that each 
increase of one count in fineness raised the piece rate by 1d, although some years 
previously it had been by 0.75d.17 Paupers spinning cotton at a workhouse at 
Marlborough in Wiltshire in the south of England in 1769 (included in the 
Humphries-Schneider dataset) were paid 6d. per lb. for their work.18  If the 1740s 
report was correct, then they were spinning 6 count yarn, a very coarse yarn used 
mainly for candlewick. Two hundred miles to the north, in Lancashire, at the same 
date the rate being paid for spinning an average 15.5 count cotton weft yarn to be 
woven into printing fabrics was more like 19d. per lb. That is a huge difference, 
even when the slower speed of spinning required for finer counts is taken into 
account. Moreover in Lancashire the average count of yarns appears to have been 
rising as fabrics became finer and lighter. The average yarn count of the cotton weft 
held in stock by Joseph Hampson, a manufacturer of jeans, stripes and pillow 
fustians at Leigh between Bolton and Wigan in 1727, was 9.6. The average yarn 
count of cotton weft held by the Blackburn firm of Cardwell, Birley and Thornton’s in 
1769 for their checks and Blackburn greys was 15.5.  Cardwell, Birley and 
Thornton’s spinners must have earned considerably more than Hampson’s, despite 
the speed penalty for finer yarn, especially as in 1769 they were being paid 1.25d. 
per hank.19 
 Humphrey and Schneider demonstrate that the wages actually earned by 
spinners were significantly lower than those estimated by élite observers, who 
tended to ignore the intermittent nature and low productivity of much spinning work. 
Consequently they exaggerated the earnings of women spinners. That is important 
if (like Humphries and Schneider) we are concerned with working women’s welfare. 
But if our concern is induced technical innovation, then the question of whether 
spinners worked intermittently or full-time is not so important, unless work patterns 
changed significantly. What matters is the level of piece rates and their variation by 
time and place and fibre. Elite observers tended to offer estimates of what they 
understood a diligent, skilled, healthy young woman could spin per day, or per six-
day week. In other words, they over-estimated the average spinner’s physical 
capacity, and the regularity and intensity of their work. Nevertheless, as long as 
their exaggeration was fairly consistent, the evidence they provide can be useful, 
especially if we know it was collected systematically. 
                                               
17 E. Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain, London 1835: 130-2. 
18 Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, PR/Marlborough St. Peter and St. Paul/871/190: Parish of St. 
Peter and St. Paul, Marlborough, Account notebook giving details of the employment of the 
Marlborough poor in Cotton Spinning, 1751-1773. 
19 John Rylands Library, University of Manchester, Eng. Ms. 1199/1: Messrs. Cardwell, Birley and 
Hornby, of Blackburn: Stock book, 1768-1792, ff. 20-2; Lancashire Archives, WCW 1727: Chester 
wills, Joseph Hampson of West Leigh, chapman. It is hazardous to draw conclusions about long-
term trends in piece rates from scattered observations like these, because we know that spinning 
piece rates were subject to frequent short-term fluctuations. 
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 The first large-scale, systematic survey of English spinners’ wages was 
undertaken by the agricultural writer Arthur Young between 1767 and 1771. During 
those years Young undertook a series of tours across the south, east and north of 
England, precursors of his French tours during the 1780s. On these journeys he 
observed agricultural practice and collected the opinions of improving landlords and 
farmers about farming techniques. The results were published in three books: A Six 
Weeks Tour through the Southern Counties of England and Wales (London, 
1768), A Six Months Tour through the North of England (London, 1770), and The 
Farmer’s Tour through the East of England (London, 1771). Young was interested 
not only in agricultural techniques, but more broadly in the rural economy and rural 
living conditions. According to the title page of his Tour through the Southern 
Counties, it is a book ‘describing particularly the present state of agriculture and 
manufactures’, but also ‘the prices of labour and provisions in different counties’ and 
‘the state of the working poor in those counties’. As a consequence, Young 
consistently recorded information about ‘the employment of the poor women and 
children’ in many of the places where he stopped to collect data from his local 
contacts. In the vast majority of cases that employment was spinning, and often 
Young tells us which fibres the spinners processed and the wages they were paid, 
whether adults or children.  
 Young’s tours do not furnish a balanced sample of spinning across rural 
England at the end of the 1760s. His tours bypassed much of the West Country and 
the places for which he provides detailed information are those where he already 
had connections, or was able to establish them. Yet Young was admirably 
systematic in the way he approached his task, asking the same questions in each 
locality he visited. Indeed, in the history of social science statistics, Young has been 
identified as the initiator of the sample survey.20 Usefully he often includes negative 
findings, although the answers he recorded are not always consistent. Together, 
Young’s three English tours include observations on the availability of women’s and 
children’s manufacturing work for almost a hundred places scattered across broad 
swathes of rural England during a period of less than four years immediately after 
the invention of the spinning jenny and before its wide diffusion (Figs 1, 2 and 3). 
 
  
                                               
20 See Liam Brunt, ‘The advent of the sample survey in the social sciences,’ Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series D (The Statistician), Vol. 50, 2001: 179-89. 
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Fig. 1. Availability of waged manufacturing work for women and 
children, England, late 1760s. Source: Arthur Young’s tours of the 
North, South and East of England, published 1768-71. 
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Fig. 2. Availability of waged spinning work for women and children, by 
textile fibre, England, late 1760s. Source: Arthur Young’s tours of the North, 
South and East of England, published 1768-71. 
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Fig. 3. Adult women’s daily spinning wages, England, late 1760s. Source: 
Arthur Young’s tours of the North, South and East of England, published 
1768-71. 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1 maps Young’s findings for the different kinds of paid manufacturing 
work available to women and children. Spinning predominated. Fig. 2 shows the 
different types of textile fibre spun in different localities. Short-staple sheep’s wool 
(for woollens) and long-staple sheep’s wool (for worsteds) were the most commonly 
spun fibres, although Young does not always distinguish between them. Cotton 
appears in only three places. Not unexpectedly, all three are in Lancashire. Fig. 3 
maps those places where Young recorded the wages available to women who 
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spun, as well as showing places where there was no such paid work. Young’s 
observations were, of course, based on estimates by his local patrician and farming 
contacts, not on actual earnings. Nevertheless, they serve to demonstrate that at a 
technologically critical period in the later 1760s there were major geographical 
variations not only in the availability of spinning work, but in the wages it could 
command. Higher wages for spinning characterised a zone in the north of England, 
extending across Lancashire, the western half of Yorkshire, and south 
Westmorland.  
 More surprisingly, if we compare Figs 2 and 3, we discover that the north of 
England high-wage zone was not restricted to spinning cotton, but included spinning 
flax and, especially, long-staple sheep’s wool for worsteds. In other words, in this 
region in the 1760s the high wages for hand spinning that Robert Allen regards as 
the key incentive to technical innovation were not confined to cotton. So why was 
innovation in spinning initially focused so narrowly on cotton? 
 The traditional explanation, dating from the mid-nineteenth century and still 
often repeated today, is that John Kay’s flying shuttle, patented in 1733, distorted 
the relationship between the spinning and weaving processes in cotton 
manufacture. The flying shuttle, it is argued, increased output per weaver, 
encouraging the growth of the Lancashire industry. The consequence was 
unprecedented pressure on the supply of yarn, which still relied on women working 
at the hand spinning wheel, resulting in rising wages.21 Humphries and Schneider 
appear to concur, arguing it was bottlenecks in the supply of yarn that drove 
technological innovation. They do not name the flying shuttle as the source of these 
bottlenecks, but they offer no alternative.   
 Yet as early as 1835, Edward Baines, like other early historians of the 
Lancashire cotton industry, acknowledged that the flying shuttle ‘was not much used 
among the cotton weavers until 1760’. Its affects are therefore unlikely to have been 
rapid enough to provide much stimulus to James Hargreaves’ experiments with his 
spinning jenny, usually dated between 1764 and 1766.22 Moreover, as Akos 
Paulinyi has calculated, the flying shuttle can have increased weaving output for 
most Lancashire cottons by no more than 30%, and generally much less, because 
the vast majority of Lancashire cotton fabrics were narrow and could be woven by a 
single weaver working the loom without the help of a flying shuttle.23 The biggest 
potential savings from the flying shuttle lay in the weaving of broad fabrics, which 
previously required the work of two weavers. It is no co-incidence that John Kay 
was brought up in the Rossendale uplands above Bury in Lancashire, where the 
predominant form of textile production was broad bays – mixed woolen / worsted 
                                               
21 For a recent deployment of this argument, see Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History, 
New York, 2014: 65. 
22 Baines, Cotton Manufacture, 117. 
23 Akos Paulinyi, ‘John Kay’s Flying Shuttle: Some Considerations on his Technical Capacity and 
Economic Impact’, Textile History, 17, 1986: 154. 
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fabrics – not narrow cottons. It was to the Rossendale baymakers, as well as their 
equivalents at Colchester in Essex, that he first supplied his new shuttles, not to 
Lancashire cotton weavers. 
 A more fruitful approach to understanding the invention of the spinning jenny 
is to place it in the context of the high spinning wages paid in the 1760s for hand 
spinning textile fibres of various kinds – not just cotton – in the zone across the 
north of England identified by Arthur Young. Hand spinning was undertaken 
predominantly by women. Systematic evidence about women’s employment in the 
eighteenth century is notoriously poor, so establishing the geographical incidence of 
any one type of spinning can often only be done indirectly.  
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Fig. 4. Lancashire and Cheshire: townships with woollen or worsted 
spinning, 1765-1789. Sources: Lancashire Record Office, Lancashire 
Quarter Sessions Files, QSB/1 and QSP; Greater Manchester Record Office, 
MS f338.4 W1, Worsted inspector’s conviction book.  
 
 
 
 Fig. 4 maps the two available systematic sources for the geographical 
distribution of spinning in Lancashire and Cheshire from 1765 to 1789. The first 
source, and the most comprehensive, is summary convictions for frauds by spinners 
of worsted yarn (spun from long-staple sheep’s wool). These convictions were 
undertaken under the first five years of the Worsted Act of 1777, which established 
a system of paid inspectors, modeled on the excise service, who were allocated 
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territories across the spinning townships.24 The inspectors travelled these territories, 
measuring yarn and prosecuting offenders. The map records all the townships 
where at least one prosecution is recorded, indicating the extent of the worsted 
spinning zone. The second source, which is less comprehensive, is summary 
convictions for embezzlement of the short-staple sheep’s wool put out to be spun by 
the woolen clothiers and baymakers of the Rossendale area of Lancashire, between 
1765 and 1789. There were fewer of these convictions than those involving worsted 
spinning. Nevertheless, they serve to sketch the extent of the woollen spinning 
zone. 
 There are no equivalent sources for cotton or flax spinning, but the map 
makes it clear that the core area of Lancashire’s cotton industry, between 
Blackburn, Bolton, Manchester and Oldham, was hemmed in to the north, the west 
and the south (as well as over the Yorkshire border to the east) by areas where 
worsted and woollen spinning offered an alternative employment for women at 
equivalent wages. To the south-west there was also flax and hemp spinning, 
especially around Warrington with its sail-making manufactory, which burgeoned 
during the 1740s and 1750s.25 Like cotton, these were buoyant, rapidly expanding 
industries. Indeed, worsted manufacturing, with its core weaving area over the 
Yorkshire border around Halifax, was a more recent arrival in the north of England 
than cotton. Whereas Lancashire started making cotton fustians towards the end of 
the sixteenth century, worsteds emerged in Yorkshire on any scale only at the end 
of the seventeenth.26  
 Predominantly an export industry, Yorkshire worsteds grew very rapidly 
during the first half of the eighteenth century, probably faster than Lancashire 
cottons. In worsteds the ratio of spinners to weavers was especially high, so to 
secure a supply of yarn the Yorkshire manufacturers were obliged to source yarn 
from an enormous area up to 50 miles away across the West and North Ridings of 
Yorkshire, as well as adjacent parts of Lancashire and Cheshire.27 This was a 
dynamic process. In the course of the eighteenth century, the worsted spinning 
                                               
24 John Styles, ‘Spinners and the Law: Regulating Yarn Standards in the English Worsted Industries, 
1550-1800’, Textile History, 44, 2013: 145-170. 
25 See Jon Stobart, The First Industrial Region: North West England, c.1700-60, Manchester 2004: 
68-9, and Charles F. Foster, Capital and Innovation (Northwich, 2004): chapter 9, esp. 275-6 and 
280. 
26 Herbert Heaton, The Yorkshire Woollen and Worsted Industries from the Earliest Times up to the 
Industrial Revolution, Oxford 1965: 258-276. 
27 John Sutcliffe, a Holdsworth, Halifax stuff maker, estimated in 1774 that in the Yorkshire worsted 
industry, there were 4 spinners to every weaver; John James, The History of the Worsted 
Manufacture in England, London 1857: 281. For Lancashire cottons, it was estimated that in 1760 ‘a 
weaver required three grown persons to supply him with weft’; Richard Guest, A Compendious 
History of the Cotton-Manufacture, Manchester 1823: 10. However, the ‘three grown persons’ 
included those preparing the cotton wool for the spinner, by picking, carding and roving, so Guest 
indicates the number of those actually spinning was roughly half this number. Sheep’s wool for 
worsted spinning, by contrast, was supplied to the spinners ready-combed, so little or no further 
preparation was needed. 
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frontier expanded further and further away from the core weaving area in Yorkshire. 
The landowner and miniature painter Samuel Finney, looking back in 1785 at the 
history of his native township of Wilmslow in Cheshire, recalled that earlier in the 
eighteenth century the women and children were employed in making silk- and 
mohair-covered buttons. As fabric-covered buttons became less fashionable around 
mid-century, the work was replaced by worsted spinning introduced by 
manufacturers from Yorkshire.28 Yet Wilmslow was only ten miles south of 
Manchester, the capital of the Lancashire cotton trade.  
 We may lack direct evidence about the precise extent of cotton spinning in 
Lancashire in the 1760s and 1770s. Nevertheless the distribution of woollen and 
worsted spinning, combined with what we know about flax spinning around Wigan 
and Warrington, indicates that the area devoted exclusively to cotton spinning was 
hemmed in and surprisingly small. There is a simple reason for this. The vast 
majority of the textiles that comprised the Lancashire ‘cotton’ industry before 1780 
consisted mainly (checks and stripes), or at least half (fustians and cotton prints) of 
linen.  
 In the seventeenth century, Lancashire textiles incorporating cotton were 
usually described as fustians. In the eighteenth century, use of the term fustian 
came increasingly to be reserved for the traditional, heavy, often napped and ribbed 
fabrics that had predominated in the previous century, such as thickset, pillow 
fustian and jeans. The new, lighter products that emerged in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries were rarely termed fustians, but were known by other 
names, such as dimities, checks, stripes and the ‘Blackburn greys’ used for printing. 
Yet these new Lancashire products remained, like the traditional fustians, mixtures 
of cotton with linen. Indeed, many of the checks and stripes contained a good deal 
more linen than cotton. In other words, the extension of the product range involved 
less cotton per yard of cloth on average than the old-style fustians, so the pressure 
to extend the cotton spinning zone was not as great as would otherwise have been 
the case. Some new, all-cotton fabrics were also developed at this time, most 
notably the famous cotton velvets, but they represented only a small proportion of 
the Lancashire industry’s output.  
 The survival of five thousand fabric swatches left with babies at the London 
Foundling Hospital between 1742 and 1760, consisting largely of the newer, lighter 
part-cotton fabrics of the types manufactured in Lancashire, enables us to employ 
microscopic analysis to assess the fibre content of a significant proportion of the 
Lancashire industry’s output on the eve of the Industrial Revolution (Figs 5, 6 and 
7).29 
                                               
28 ‘Survey of the Parish of Wilmslow’ by Samuel Finney of Fulshaw, Esq., in T. Worthington Barlow, 
ed., The Cheshire and Lancashire Historical Collector, Vol. 2, May 1853: 6-7. 
29 For the background to the Foundling Hospital textiles, see John Styles, Threads of Feeling: The 
London Foundling Hospital’s Textile Tokens, 1740-1770, London, 2010. The fibre analysis was 
undertaken with a Dino-Lite AM7013MZT USB microscope at x60 magnification.  
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Fig. 5. A printed cotton from the Foundling Hospital textiles, 1759. Only 
the fluffy, horizontal loosely-spun weft threads are cotton. The smooth, 
shiny tightly-spun warp threads are linen. London Metropolitan Archives, 
A/FH/A/9/1/162: Foundling Hospital Billet Books, Foundling number 
14713. © Coram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
‘Purpill flowerd cotting … cuft with 
worckt callico’, 1759. Foundling 14713.
‘Purpill flowerd cotting’, 1759, at x60 
magnification. Foundling 14713
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Fig. 6. A striped cotton from the Foundling Hospital textiles, 1759. The 
fluffy blue threads and white threads in the stripe are cotton. The smooth, 
shiny threads are linen. London Metropolitan Archives, A/FH/A/9/1/149: 
Foundling Hospital Billet Books, Foundling number 13400. © Coram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Striped cotten’, 1759. Foundling 13400. ‘Striped cotten’, 1759, at x60 
magnification. Foundling 13400. 
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Fig. 7. A check from the Foundling Hospital textiles, 1759. Only the fluffy, 
darker blue threads are cotton. The smooth, shiny white threads and 
light blue threads are linen. London Metropolitan Archives, 
A/FH/A/9/1/149: Foundling Hospital Billet Books, Foundling number 
13416. © Coram. 
 
 
 
 The analysis in Table 1 of a large sample of the kind of fabrics produced by 
the Lancashire ‘cotton’ industry in the London Foundling Hospital collection shows 
that less than half the yarn employed was cotton. Most of the printed fabrics were 
the half-cotton, half-linen cloth known as ‘Blackburn greys’, but the mixed-fibre 
checks and stripes tended to contain more linen yarn than cotton yarn, and many of 
the checks were all-linen. This pattern of fibre composition was typical; it recurs in 
surviving sample books for Lancashire checks, stripes and prints circulated by 
Manchester merchants in the 1760s, the 1770s and even the early 1780s.30  
 
  
                                               
30 Winterthur Museum, Delaware, USA, ref. 07 x 5: Henry Remsen, Jr. and Company, Pattern book 
of textiles, 1767; Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 156.4 T 31: The Benjamin and John Bower 
sample book, 1771; National Trust, Quarry Bank Mill, Styal: Pattern book of the firm of Robert and 
Nathan Hyde, of Manchester, 1771; Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Collection, Virginia, 1974-569: 
fold-out pattern card inscribed ‘Thomas Smith, Manchester, 23 August 1783’. 
Check, 1759, at x60 magnification. 
Foundling 13416. Check, 1759. Foundling 13416. 
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Table 1. Fibre content of yarns in prints, checks and stripes made of cotton and/or 
linen in the London Foundling Hospital Billet Books, July 1759 and January 1760. 
 
Fibre  Prints Checks Stripes All 
Warp cotton, weft cotton 7 - - 7  (6%) 
Warp silk, weft cotton 1 - 3 4  (4%) 
Warp linen, weft cotton 42 1 5 48  (46%) 
Warp linen, weft linen & cotton - 12 8 20  (19%) 
Warp linen, weft linen *n/a 17 5 22  (21%) 
Unclear 2 1 1 4  (4%) 
TOTAL 52 31 22 105 (100%) 
 
* Prints on all-linen fabric are excluded, because the cloth was probably woven not in Lancashire, but in 
Ireland, Scotland, or Germany. 
Source: London Metropolitan Archives, Foundling Hospital Billet Books, AF/149 (July 1759) and /166 
(January 1760). 
 
 By the 1750s, the linen yarn used in these Lancashire-woven fabrics was 
spun, not by Lancashire women, but mainly in Ireland, Scotland and on the shores 
of the eastern Baltic. A much larger proportion of locally-spun linen yarn may have 
been used in seventeenth-century Lancashire fustians, but by 1782 the Manchester 
merchant Titus Hibbert insisted that English yarn was very little used.31 As a 
consequence, the geography of spinning for the Lancashire industry was very 
different from the Yorkshire worsted industry. In Lancashire, less than half the yarn 
woven (the cotton) was spun within the region, so the spinning field was 
geographically far less extensive at any level of output than that of the Yorkshire 
worsted industry, which sourced almost all its yarn, both warp and weft, locally. At 
the same time, this pattern of yarn supply sustained the practice of devolving 
responsibility for spinning the cotton yarn to the weaver, which appears to have 
become widespread during the middle decades of the eighteenth century in the 
manufacture of the Lancashire ‘cottons’ with the highest proportion of cotton yarn – 
the traditional fustians and the Blackburn greys sent to London for printing.32 The 
weaver was provided by the putting-out master with a ready-spun linen warp and 
unspun cotton wool for the weft. He was expected not only to weave the cloth, but 
also to arrange the spinning of the cotton weft yarn.33 Spinning weft required less 
                                               
31 Mrs Hibbert Ware, The Life and Correspondence of the late Samuel Hibbert Ware, Manchester 
1882: 98. 
32 This way of organizing spinning was not feasible for checks and stripes, even when they contained 
a large proportion of cotton, because at least part of their cotton yarn had to be dyed before it was 
woven. Dyeing tended to be concentrated in specialist plants, especially around Manchester; see J. 
Stobart, ‘Textile Industries in North-West England in the early Eighteenth Century: A Geographical 
Approach’, Textile History, 29, 1998: 8-9. 
33 This practice was probably borrowed from the baymaking industry of Rossendale, where it was 
widespread. 
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labour than spinning warp, especially the loosely spun, coarse weft characteristic of 
many Lancashire cotton-linen fabrics. Consequently, it was feasible for a weaver to 
have the cotton weft spinning undertaken locally, often mainly by his own family.  
 Blackburn greys were the principal fabric produced in the Oswaldtwistle area 
where James Hargreaves, the inventor of the spinning jenny, worked as a weaver. 
Between the 1730s and the 1760s, the domestic market for these printed half-
cotton, half-linen fabrics expanded, while the supply of both linen yarn and cotton 
wool was becoming more erratic and more expensive.34 Crucially for Hargreaves’ 
invention of the spinning jenny, the Yorkshire worsted industry also boomed during 
the 1750s and early 1760s.35 Oswaldtwistle was within the worsted spinning zone 
(Fig. 4) and good wages for worsted spinners are likely to have attracted women 
away from spinning cotton, just as they drew them away from button making at 
roughly the same period at Wilmslow, 30 miles to the south. In Oswaldtwistle that 
was a challenge faced directly by weavers like Hargreaves, because it was they 
who often bore the responsibility for having their employer’s raw cotton spun into 
weft. As initially conceived, Hargreaves’ spinning jenny spun only weft, it was 
domestic in scale, and it was optimised for use by children (Fig. 8). In other words, it 
was perfectly contrived to sustain the weaver-based model for processing weft in 
the face of competition for spinning labour in the locality, because it enabled 
weavers to rely more exclusively on family labour to convert the cotton wool their 
employers supplied into yarn.36 Ironically, in view of Robert Allen’s focus on factors 
of production, under this arrangement spinning labour was not directly priced. A 
notional payment for the spinning undertaken by a family’s women and children was 
simply bundled into the weaver’s contract. 
 
  
                                               
34 See John Styles, The Dress of the People: Everyday Fashion in Eighteenth-Century England, 
London and New Haven 2007: 111-27; Trevor Griffiths, Philip Hunt, and Patrick O’Brien, 'Scottish, 
Irish and Imperial Connections: Parliament, the Three Kingdoms, and the mechanisation of cotton 
spinning in eighteenth-century Britain,' EcHR, Vol. 61, 2008: 625-50. 
35 John Styles, ‘“Our Traitorous Money Makers”: the Yorkshire Coiners and the Law, 1760-1783’, in 
John Brewer and John Styles, eds, An Ungovernable People. The English and their Law in the 
Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Centuries, London 1980: 189-90. For the especially rapid growth in 
Yorkshire worsteds in the decades up to the end of the 1750s, see Keith Sugden, ‘An occupational 
analysis of the worsted industry, c. 1700-1851. A study of de-industrialization in Norfolk and the rise 
of the West Riding of Yorkshire’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2015, chapter 6, and Elvira 
Willmott, ‘Occupations in Eighteenth Century Bradford’, The Bradford Antiquary, 3rd series, Vol. 4, 
1989: 67-77. 
36 This interpretation of the impact of the spinning jenny has a long pedigree; see John Kennedy, 
‘Observations on the Rise and Progress of the Cotton Trade in Great Britain, Particularly in 
Lancashire and the Adjoining Counties (Read Before the Literary and Philosophical Society, 3rd 
November 1815)’ in John Kennedy, Miscellaneous Papers on Subjects Connected with the 
Manufactures of Lancashire, Manchester 1849: 7, and T.S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution, 1760-
1830, Oxford 1997: 58, which insists the effect of small jennies ‘was to strengthen, rather than 
weaken, the family economy.’   
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Fig. 8. Reconstruction of a sixteen-spindle spinning jenny, based on the 
specification drawings in James Hargreaves’ 1770 patent. 
 
 
 
 An equivalent familial incentive to take up the jenny was absent in 
Normandy, the centre of French cotton manufacturing, where linen warp, cotton 
weft fabrics also predominated. Here spinning of cotton weft was not part of an 
integrated family textile economy, supplied with raw and semi-finished materials by 
a putting-out master, to whom woven cloth was returned in exchange for a single 
wage payment. In Normandy, cotton spinning was often a separate, small-scale 
commercial activity, conducted by the women who spun. Arthur Young described 
how they ‘buy their cotton, spin it, and then sell the yarn’.37 Most of the cloth 
(Siamoise) was loom-patterned, the equivalent of Lancashire checks and stripes, so 
yarn had to be dyed prior to weaving. In the early 1760s, Normandy was not a major 
                                               
37 Young, Travels during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789, second edition, Vol. 1: 564. Also see 
André Rémond, John Holker: Manufacturier et Grand Fonctionnaire en France au XVIIIme Siècle, 
1719-1786, Paris 1946: 139-40 and William Reddy, The Rise of Market Culture: The Textile Trade 
and French Society, 1750-1900, Cambridge 1984: 131-2. 
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producer of heavy fustians or grey cloth for printing, while cotton spinning faced less 
competition for spinning labour from other fibres than in Lancashire. Indeed, in 
Normandy it was the spinning of non-cotton fibres, such as woollen yarn for cloth 
manufacturers at Darnétal and Elbeuf, that was threatened by cotton.38 
 Robert Allen is right, therefore, to argue that James Hargreaves’ invention of 
the spinning jenny was an innovation associated with pressure in the market for 
spinning labour. Yet that pressure was not, as Allen would have us believe, an 
aspect of a distinctively British high wage economy which extended to women and 
children’s earnings. It emerged in a specific locality at a specific moment. It affected 
spinners of a range of fibres, among whom those who spun cotton were not the 
most numerous. To explain Hargreaves’ invention we need to focus beyond labour 
costs to the distinctive way spinning work was organized in Lancashire for the 
production of a key intermediate good – the cotton-linen Blackburn greys which 
supplied the London textile printing industry. 
 
 
 
  
                                               
38 Serge Chassagne, ‘La diffusion rurale de l’industrie cotonnière en France (1750-1850)’, Revue du 
Nord, 61, 1979: 101 and Alain Becchia, La draperie d'Elbeuf, des origines à 1870, Rouen 2000: 190. 
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3. British markets for cottons in the 18th century. 
The origins of the spinning jenny suggest that analysis of technological innovation 
requires attention to products, their material composition and their markets. Yet 
product mix and demand find no place among Robert Allen’s inducements to 
innovation.39 This omission is especially odd, because it ignores Joseph Inikori’s 
well-known argument that a mid-18th century rise in exports of Lancashire cottons – 
especially checks – to West Africa, where they were exchanged for slaves, was a 
crucial stimulus for the mechanization of British spinning.40 Allen’s approach is 
rooted in global comparisons, but his comparisons do not extend beyond factor 
prices. He is not interested in the material comparisons that were constantly being 
made by 18th century manufacturers, merchants and consumers in the course of 
global exchange. 
 It is, of course, notoriously difficult to establish the pattern of demand, 
especially domestic demand, for eighteenth-century British manufactured goods, 
due to a shortage of data. The new estimates for changes in demand for British 
(mainly Lancashire) cottons, set out in this section, divide the industry into different 
sub-sectors, along lines widely recognized by contemporaries. The estimates cover 
the four decades from the 1740s to the 1770s. These were the four decades before 
the mechanical inventions in spinning of the early Industrial Revolution began to 
have a marked effect on patterns of consumption in the 1780s. They are also the 
earliest four decades when the surviving digitized records of theft cases tried at the 
Old Bailey in London are sufficiently comprehensive to establish trends in the 
ownership of goods in the metropolis through time. The other principal sources 
employed are records of excise taxation and the 5,000 textiles surviving from 1741 
to 1760 in the collection of the London Foundling Hospital.41 
 For most of these middle decades of the eighteenth century, all-cotton woven 
fabrics were either prohibited (if colour-patterned), or taxed extremely heavily (if 
undyed and imported). Both the Old Bailey trials and the Foundling textiles suggest 
that, in contrast to France where all printed textiles were banned, smuggling of 
printed calicoes and all-cotton stripes or checks into England was not significant. 
Less than 10% of printed textiles in the Foundling Hospital textiles were calicoes, 
and a good number of those may have leaked out of London printworks where they 
were processed for re-export. The British domestic market for ‘cottons’ in these 
years, whether printed or not, was largely a market for mixed fabrics consisting 
partly of cotton yarn and partly of linen yarn. These materials were mainly imported, 
                                               
39 This is not altogether surprising. Economic historians have been loth to accord an autonomous role 
to demand since Joel Mokyr’s influential ‘Demand vs. Supply in the Industrial Revolution’, Journal of 
Economic History, 37, 1977: 981-1008. Mokyr, channelling Say, insists that aggregate economic 
growth can only derive from changes in supply – cost-reducing innovations – and that there is little 
evidence for changes in demand inducing or stimulating technological innovation. 
40 J. Inikori, ‘Slavery and the Revolution in Cotton Textile Production in England’, Social Science 
History, 13, 1989: 343-79. 
41 London Metropolitan Archives, A/FH/A/9/1/1-178: Foundling Hospital Billet Books, 1741-1760.  
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whether in the form of cotton wool from the West Indies, and to a lesser extent the 
Levant, to be spun in Britain, or as ready-spun linen yarn from the Baltic, Scotland, 
or Ireland. As with all the other mixed fabrics which proliferated in early-modern 
Europe, there was considerable potential here for substitution of one material for 
another, according to changes in prices, tastes and techniques. 
 
Table 2. 
 
  
 In the Spring of 1788, the Scottish merchant and statistician, Patrick 
Colquhoun, compiled estimates of how cotton wool imported into Britain ‘is 
supposed at present to be applied … according to an estimate made by intelligent 
manufacturers’ (Table 2).42 Colquhoun was at the time a paid lobbyist on behalf of 
one interest group among those manufacturers – the calico and muslin makers – in 
its dispute with the East India Company and the fustian makers, so his figures have 
to be treated with considerable suspicion. Moreover, for many of his categories, 
quantities and the balance between cotton content and linen content had changed 
radically in the course of the 1780s. Nevertheless, if we substitute for his calico the 
mixed cotton-linens used previously for printing and ignore muslins, whose 
production emerged only in the 1780s, his headings capture the main segments of 
British cotton manufacturing in the middle decades of the 18th century. I shall use 
them (in a modified form) to structure my analysis. 
 
                                               
42 P. Colquhoun, An Important Crisis in the Callico and Muslin Manufactory in Great Britain, 
explained, ?London, 1788: 8. Colquhoun compiled four different estimates. Figure 5 is based on 
what appears to be the earliest, dated 6 March 1788. It provides the most detailed breakdown, which 
Colquhoun subsequently simplified and inflated for publication. 
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 Table 3. 
 
 
 In Table 3 I have used Excise revenues and Old Bailey trial data to calculate 
the rate of increase between the 1740s and the 1770s in the production or 
ownership of types of cottons that represent earlier counterparts to each of 
Colquhoun’s headings. Bear in mind that between the 1740s and the 1770s the total 
number of trials at the Old Bailey increased by 50%, so the increase in the number 
of trials involving cotton hosiery, checks and fustians might over-represent changes 
in ownership by roughly a third (the deflated figures in brackets are adjusted to take 
account of this possibility). Nevertheless, increases were substantial. Following 
Colquhoun, I have included parallel data for retained imports of cotton wool. Unlike 
Colquhoun, I have also provided data for linen yarn imports, because, in the period 
before the 1780s, cotton-linen mixes predominated. I shall consider each category 
in turn. 
 First, candles (Fig. 9). Cotton was the best (and most expensive) material for 
candlewicks, so the excise revenues from the duty on superior tallow candles 
provide a crude index of this use of cotton. As Edward Baines noted in 1835, 
candlewick must have accounted for a large and relatively unchanging proportion of 
cotton imports between the 1710s and 1740s, suggesting demand from other uses 
of raw cotton was limited and stagnant.43 Thereafter candlewick’s share declined 
progressively, indicating that it was only after 1740 that consumption of raw cotton 
for other purposes expanded rapidly. 
                                               
43 Baines, Cotton Manufacture, 216. 
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       Fig. 9. 
 
 
 
 Second, cotton hosiery (Fig. 10). Cotton stockings hardly figure at all at the 
Old Bailey before 1730. Rapid growth in their consumption had to wait for the 
invention of the Derby rib attachment for the stocking frame at the end of the 1750s 
(non-ribbed knitted stockings lacked elasticity). Thereafter consumption exploded, 
so that by the 1780s cotton stockings accounted for some 40% of all the stockings 
stolen in London, securing market share from stockings made both from worsted 
and from thread (linen), despite costing more. Not only was the nearly sixfold 
increase between the 1740s and the 1770s in Old Bailey cotton stocking cases 
larger than the increase in any other of our headings; it also involved a 
disproportionate amount of raw cotton, because the stockings were made entirely of 
cotton and their tightly twisted and doubled thread required relatively more cotton 
wool than the single yarns generally used in weaving piece goods. 
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Fig. 10. 
 
 
  
 Third, Colqhoun’s silk mixtures and linen and check mixtures, for which 
checks will serve as my example (Fig. 11). There is little evidence for the use of 
checked fabrics made from linen and / or cotton in Britain during the 17th century. 
Early in the 18th century, however, checks were being woven in Lancashire and 
stolen in London. By the 1740s they were a well-established commodity in Britain, 
especially familiar as women’s blue and white aprons, and their domestic market 
increased substantially over the next three decades. It is conventional for economic 
historians to categorize them as cottons, especially because they resembled an 
important group of Indian all-cotton fabrics that sold in vast quantities across early-
modern east and south Asia, as well as in Africa. Yet among checks in the 
Foundling Hospital collection dating from 1759-60 (Fig. 12), the majority were made 
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entirely of linen, while almost all the rest were predominantly linen, with just a 
handful of cotton yarns to provide a stronger colour. 
 
Fig. 11.  
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Fig. 12. 
 
 
Hardly any were 50:50 cotton:linen and none were all-cotton. The reason is simple. 
Improving the colour of the criss-cross pattern by including even a small proportion 
of cotton yarn increased the price of what were among the cheapest colour-
patterned fabrics (Fig. 13). Both in England and in colonial British North America, 
linen checks sold for less per yard than cotton checks, and what were described as 
cotton checks were far from being all-cotton. 
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Fig. 13. A cotton-linen check and the same check at x60 magnification. 
 
 
 This finding casts doubt on Joseph Inikori’s insistence that the huge increase 
from the 1750s in exports of British-made checks to West Africa to be exchanged 
for slaves was a crucial stimulus to the mechanization of British spinning.44 The 
British checks exported to Africa were, like those sold in Britain, largely either all-
linen or predominantly linen, so their cotton content was unlikely to have been a 
crucial stimulus for mechanical innovation. Inikori is correct to argue that a process 
of substitution was at work, but the key context was the failure in the middle 
decades of the 18th century of Indian supply of the loom-patterned textiles which 
were the principal commodity exchanged for slaves in Africa (Fig. 14). Before 1750, 
the British were already serving a small market for linens in West Africa. In the 
1750s, as demand for slaves increased and supplies of Indian textiles declined, 
British (especially Liverpool) merchants provided both additional plain linens and 
developed a market for versions of the Lancashire linen and linen-cotton checks 
already selling on the domestic market. These checks were inferior adaptations of 
Indian designs, but lower in price by courtesy of their high linen content. Their 
                                               
44 Inikori, ‘Slavery and the Revolution in Cotton Textile Production’: 355 and 369. 
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cheapness was probably what sustained their market in Africa once Indian supply 
revived after 1760, although after 1770 their sales no longer increased. 
 
Fig. 14. 
 
  
  Like checks, the last two categories of cotton textiles I have derived from 
Colquhoun – fustians and printed cotton-linens – were predominantly mixtures of 
cotton and linen. However, unlike checks, the two fibres were usually combined in 
these fabrics in a roughly 50:50 ratio, with a soft cotton weft yarn and a stronger, 
more twisted linen warp yarn. The Old Bailey trials suggest consumption of fustians 
barely doubled between the 1740s and 1770s, the slowest growth of any of 
Colqhhoun’s textile categories. The new types of fustians introduced in the middle 
decades of the 18th century – cotton velvets, velverets and velveteens – did not 
make a strong showing before the 1780s (Fig. 15). These new fustians were to 
become widely used for men’s waistcoats and breeches, substituting for silk, 
worsted and leather, but they were relatively expensive, particularly the famous 
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Manchester all-cotton velvets woven with double cotton warps. In the Old Bailey 
trials, it is velverets that appear most frequently. They appear to have been cheaper, 
probably because they used a linen ground warp, but they still required a 
supplementary cotton warp for the pile.45  
 
Fig. 15.
 
 
  The final category of cotton textiles derived from Colquhoun’s list is printed 
cotton-linen fabrics. There is no direct equivalent for this on Colquhoun’s list, 
                                               
45 In the early 1750s Manchester velvets sold at 5s. 6d. to 8s. 6d. per yard, despite being little more 
than half a yard in width; Bibliothèque de la Union Centrale des Arts Decoratifs, Paris,  G.C. 2: le 
Livre d'Echantillons de John Holker, c. 1750, swatch 55. For warps, see J.H.L. Bergius, Neues 
policey- und cameral-magazin nach alphabetischer ordung, vol. 5, Leipzig, 1779: 77-9. 
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because by the late 1780s cotton-linens for printing had been almost entirely 
superseded by all-cotton, machine-spun calico, which Colquhoun put in a separate 
category along with muslin. Printed fabrics were subject to excise taxation, so we 
have reasonably comprehensive data on output (Fig. 16). Unfortunately, the excise 
data distinguishes only between printed calicoes, largely Indian and prohibited in 
the domestic market from 1722 to 1774, and printed linens and stuffs, a category 
which embraced both cotton-linen fabrics and all-linen fabrics. The excise data 
reveals a big leap in printing on these alternatives to calico in the immediate 
aftermath of the introduction of the prohibition legislation in 1722, followed by two 
decades of stagnation. Further expansion began in the 1740s, peaking at the end of 
the 1760s, but then collapsing in the 1780s in the face of competition from machine-
spun British printed calico. 
 
Fig. 16. 
 
  
 What the excise data do not reveal is the relative shares of cotton-linen 
fabrics and all-linen fabrics in printing. If we add the figures for retained raw cotton 
imports to the chart (Fig. 17), we see that from the mid-1750s to the mid-1770s the 
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rise in output of printed fabrics consistently outpaced increases in the available 
supplies of cotton wool and, therefore, cotton yarn.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. 
 
 
 Unlike the check makers, the manufacturers of cotton-linen fabrics for 
printing did not have the option of reducing the proportion of cotton yarn in each 
piece of cloth. A 50:50 cotton to linen ratio, with a thick, fluffy, richly coloured cotton 
weft and a finer, smoother and less visible linen warp, was essential for producing 
the desired printed-cotton finish (Fig. 18).  
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Fig. 18. A polychrome print on cotton-linen and the same print at x60 
magnification.  
 
 
  Old Bailey trials for printed cottons suggest that what happened instead was 
substitution of printed linens for printed cotton-linens. Women’s gowns were one of 
the main outlets for printed fabrics.46 Between the 1740s and the 1770s, the number 
of trials involving linen gowns increased two and a half times faster than trials 
involving cotton-linen gowns Table 4). Linen gowns were cheaper than cotton-linen 
gowns (Table 5) and, although their weight, drape and aesthetic effect were 
different and in some respects inferior, technical innovations like the indigo cold vat 
process and printing with large copper plates made prints on linen increasingly 
desirable at this period. So, to return to the excise data for printed fabrics (Fig. 16), 
what we are actually observing in the aggregated figures (the blue line) from the 
1750s and 1760s is an overall increase that conceals a shift away from printed 
cotton-linens towards printed linens. 
  
                                               
46 See, for an American example, L.M. Hawes, ed., The Letter Book of Thomas Rasberry, 1758-1761, 
Savannah, Georgia, 1959: 63-4. 
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   Table 4. 
 
 
 Table 5. 
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4. Spinning the Industrial Revolution. 
What are the implications of this pattern of demand for understanding the spinning 
macro-inventions of the early Industrial Revolution – not just the spinning jenny 
presented by Robert Allen as ‘the Industrial Revolution in miniature’, but also 
Richard Arkwright’s water frame? The 1750s and 1760s, when these machines 
were conceived and initially developed, emerge as particularly challenging decades 
– indeed, almost a perfect storm. Stagnant demand for cottons from the 1720s to 
the 1740s was followed by strong growth in the domestic market for fustians, 
checks, cotton-linens for printing, and, especially from the late 1750s, cotton 
stockings. Overseas, new opportunities arose from a combination of contracting 
Indian supply and rising Indian prices, at a time when India remained the world’s 
foremost exporter of cotton textiles. Yet the capacity of Lancashire manufacturers to 
respond to these opportunities was hampered by acute shortages of raw and 
intermediate materials, and of spinning labour.  
 During the 16th and 17th centuries, Indian supply of a huge range of cotton 
and cotton-silk fabrics had proved remarkably elastic in response to fast-growing 
European demand. This was not to be the case in the 18th century. Production 
constraints, partly to do with warfare on the subcontinent in the middle decades of 
the century, resulted in a fall in imports by both the English (EIC) and the Dutch 
(VOC) East India Companies from the 1730s to the 1760s, subsequently reversed 
(Fig. 19). Prices continued to rise, however (Fig. 20).47 
 
 
 
  
                                               
47 C. Nierstrasz, Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textiles: The English and Dutch East India Companies 
(1700-1800), Basingstoke, 2015: chapters 4 and 5. 
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Fig. 19. Textile imports from India, 1700-80, quantities (courtesy Chris 
Nierstrasz). 
 
Fig. 20. Textile imports from India, 1700-80, prices (courtesy Chris Nierstrasz). 
 
 
  
41 
Nevertheless, during the 1750s and 1760s British producers of cottons were 
afflicted by their own problems securing raw and intermediate materials, which were 
largely imported. Raw cotton prices doubled in the course of the 1740s. They were 
subsequently extremely volatile, with very high peaks (Fig. 21).  
 
 
Fig. 21. 
 
 
 
 
Linen yarn prices rose too, especially in the 1740s and the later 1750s, following the 
same trajectory as raw cotton, but less dramatically. Linen yarn continued to be 
substantially cheaper than cotton yarn, selling at around half of its price per lb., or 
less (Fig. 22). 
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Fig. 22. 
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The supply of linen yarn in these decades grew faster than raw cotton (Fig. 23). 
 
Fig. 23. 
 
 
 The exceptionally high cost of raw cotton at this period and the fact that it 
was spun locally in Britain provided strong inducements to mechanical innovation in 
cotton spinning. Mechanization offered not only the promise of reducing the cost of 
spinning labour in a fast-growing industry, but also of a more consistent, even, and 
therefore less wasteful yarn. However, most of the products we have discussed 
were mixtures of cotton with linen. Where trade-offs were possible between the two 
fibres, inducements to cut costs by mechanical means were reduced. With checks, 
for example, substitution of cheap linen yarn for expensive cotton was a feasible 
cost-reduction strategy.  
 In exploring the role of demand as an inducement to mechanical innovation, 
we therefore need to focus on those cottons where this kind of substitution by 
varying fibre content was more difficult. Three categories of cottons characterized 
by high demand but low potential for fibre substitution provided especially strong 
incentives for mechanical innovation:-  
 
(1) What I have called in this paper the new fustians – the all-cotton Manchester 
velvets and the cheaper velverets. Although velverets often had inexpensive linen 
ground warps, their fibre content remained predominantly cotton. In addition to a 
cotton weft, they required a fixed proportion of supplementary cotton warps for their 
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velvet pile (typically in a 2:1 ratio of ground warps to pile warps). All these cotton 
velvet fabrics were relatively expensive and their sales were correspondingly limited 
before the 1770s. Nevertheless, they were regarded, at home and abroad, as a 
formidable technical achievement. The attempt to copy them was crucial for 
improvements in cotton spinning in France in the 1750s and 1760s, and similar 
considerations applied in Britain.48 
 
(2) Cotton stockings. Of all the categories of cottons discussed in this paper, cotton 
stockings witnessed the fastest growth in consumption in the mid-eighteenth 
century, albeit from close to zero. Like the best cotton velvets, they were all-cotton 
products, but not subject to legislative restrictions. Produced mainly in and around 
Nottingham, they made heavy demands on cotton spinners in terms of yarn twist 
and evenness. Both of the early successful Lancastrian innovators in mechanical 
spinning – James Hargreaves and Richard Arkwright – took their inventions to 
Nottingham at an early stage in their development. Their migration has been 
explained in terms of push factors – hostility from Lancashire hand spinners and 
weavers in the late 1760s – but the evidence presented in this paper suggests a 
more important consideration may have been the pull of very rapidly growing 
demand from Nottingham hosiers for consistent yarn.49 
 
(3) Printed cotton-linens. As we have seen, mixed cotton-linen fabric for printing 
incorporated expensive cotton weft yarn and cheaper linen warp yarn in a roughly 
50:50 ratio. There was no potential here for cutting costs by changing the ratio and 
incorporating more linen yarn, so the response to the pressures of the 1750s and 
1760s took other forms. James Hargreaves was a weaver employed by Blackburn 
manufacturers to make cotton-linen fabrics for printing. His spinning jenny of c.1765 
produced weft for cotton-linens that was cheaper and more consistent, at a time 
when the lion’s share of rising domestic demand for printed textiles was going to 
prints on all-linen fabric.50  
 However, there was also an incentive to innovation in printed cotton textiles 
from overseas. In the British colonies in the Americas, decorated, all-cotton Indian 
calicoes were not subjected to the prohibitions and tariffs imposed in Great Britain in 
the early decades of the eighteenth century.51 All types of Indian textiles could be 
imported and used in the American colonies, as long as they were shipped from 
                                               
48 For the importance accorded to cotton velvets, see A. P. Wadsworth and J. de L. Mann, The Cotton 
Trade and Industrial Lancashire 1600-1780, Manchester, 1965: 174-5; J.R. Harris, Industrial 
Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century, Aldershot, 1998: 
chapters 3 and 7. 
49 C. Aspin & S.D. Chapman, James Hargreaves and the Spinning Jenny, Helmshore, 1964: 16-19. 
50 For a critique of Robert Allen’s recent interpretation of the origins of Hargreave’s spinning jenny, 
see Styles, ‘Fashion, Textiles and the Origins of Industrial Revolution’ 
(http://www.history.ac.uk/publications/east-asian-journal-of-british-history). 
51 J. Eacott, ‘Making an Imperial Compromise: The Calico Acts, the Atlantic Colonies, and the 
Structure of the British Empire’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 69, 2012: 731-762. 
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India via Great Britain. American consumers sustained a firm preference for prints 
on Indian all-cotton calico across the decades after 1722, when their British 
counterparts were required to make do with prints on linen-warp, cotton-weft 
cottons. They exercised that preference despite prints on calico being more 
expensive than equivalent prints on cotton. During the three years 1769 to 1771, 
which provide the most detailed information about imports available for the colonial 
period, prints on Indian all-cotton fabric (foreign printed calicoes) outsold British 
cotton-linen prints (British printed cotton) by almost four to one in the British 
colonies in North America (Fig. 24). The printed designs were often identical, 
because in both cases the textile printing was mostly done in the vicinity of London, 
not in India, nor in Lancashire. 
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Fig. 24. 
 
 By the mid-eighteenth century, North America had become the largest single 
market for Indian calicoes printed in Britain. Yet at the same time, supply problems 
in India meant the East India Company faced increasing difficulty supplying the 
plain white calicoes used for printing. The numbers of white calicoes supplied from 
India fell, reaching a low point in the early 1760s, and prices rose, yet American 
consumption kept on expanding (Fig. 25). It was, therefore, America, more than any 
other market, that demonstrated the potential profits the Lancashire cotton industry 
was foregoing due to its inability to produce cotton warps economically for printed 
fabrics. Lancastrians must have been well aware that their cotton-linen prints were 
very much second-best in America. The 1750s and 1760s saw the start of printing 
on cotton-linen in Lancashire and the beginning of large-scale direct exporting of 
fustians, checks, stripes and dimities from Lancashire to North America.52 Lacking 
the capacity to spin cotton warps, Lancashire producers of cotton-linen fabrics for 
printing were at a marked disadvantage in the American market. 
 
                                               
52 P. Maw, ‘Yorkshire and Lancashire ascendant: England’s textile exports to New York and 
Philadelphia, 1750-1805’, Economic History Review, 63, 2010: 738; Winterthur Museum, ref. 07 x 5: 
Henry Remsen, Jr., and Co. (New York), Pattern book [of textiles] received from Messrs. Benjamin & 
John Bower, merchants, Manchester, 1767. 
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Fig. 25. 
 
 
 It was Richard Arkwright, not James Hargreaves, who successfully 
responded to this opportunity, just as he responded to the opportunity provided by 
the expanding market for cotton stockings more effectively (and successfully) than 
his fellow Lancastrian innovator. Whether Arkwright began work on his spinning 
machine in 1767 with the objective of producing high twist cotton warp yarn is 
unclear, although his use of a spindle and flyer mechanism, which tends to put a 
high twist into yarn and was used for hand spinning of flax, suggests he did. He was 
certainly quick to set his new yarn to work making calicoes for printing. Within a few 
months of his first, horse-powered Nottingham spinning mill going into full 
production in late 1772, he was having the yarn it produced woven into calicoes.53  
Previously, in March of that year, he had already been experimenting with using the 
new yarn in ribbed stockings and velverets.54 
                                               
53 R.S. Fitton, The Arkwrights: Spinners of Fortune, Manchester, 1989: 26-37.  
54 Fitton, The Arkwrights: 31. 
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 So did Robert Allen choose the wrong candidate for applying the theory of 
induced innovation? Was Richard Arkwright’s water frame, not James Hargreaves’ 
spinning jenny, the macro-invention that responded to shifts in prices of the key 
factors of production in the mid-eighteenth century, notably the price of labour in a 
high wage economy? As we have seen, the cost of labour in Lancashire for 
spinning all kinds of fibres was relatively high. For cotton, it appears to have been 
rising since the 1720s, partly, at least, as the quality of weft yarn improved. 
Arkwright was sensitive to labour costs, as his correspondence while establishing 
his first factory at Nottingham shows. Nevertheless, overcoming the previously 
insurmountable obstacles to spinning cotton warp at a commercially viable price 
represented a far more powerful incentive.55 It was the textile equivalent of the 
European discovery of the secret of porcelain – a means of making something 
much desired in Europe (and America) that could previously only be imported from 
Asia. 
 Moreover, Arkwright’s innovation was not simply a response to the economic 
opportunities of the 1750s and 1760s. As has often been pointed out, Arkwright 
invented relatively little. Like Apple’s Steve Jobs, as described by Malcolm Gladwell, 
Arkwright was a tweaker – he made other people’s inventions work effectively.56 
The immediate history of those inventions stretched back across the previous four 
decades, but their deeper genealogy lay in medieval Italy. In many respects they 
exemplify Mokyr’s ‘great synergy of the Enlightenment’ – the combination of useful 
knowledge and institutional incentives. The influence of Baconian ideas, the 
liberality of the patent system and high tariff barriers against foreign manufactured 
goods all made eighteenth-century Britain a congenial environment for mechanical 
innovation in textiles. Yet the inventions Arkwright exploited were also grounded in 
the preoccupation of European states with economic competition and luxury 
manufacturing long before the Enlightenment. 
 Historians tend to view the Industrial Revolution retrospectively as the 
founding moment of modernity. In interpreting the textile innovations of the late 
eighteenth century, their perspective has been profoundly shaped by authors like 
Adolphe Blanqui and Edward Baines who wrote some of the earliest histories of 
cotton in the Industrial Revolution.57 Theirs was a backwards view from a very 
particular moment – the moment in the 1830s when cotton had become a mass 
production, mass market textile, when prices of cottons had fallen so far that huge 
quantities of worsteds were being manufactured with cotton warps, and when cotton 
was supplanting linen for working people’s shirting and sheeting for the first time, 
because it had finally become cheap enough to overcome its deficiencies in 
                                               
55 Fitton, The Arkwrights: 31 
56 M. Gladwell, ‘The Tweaker: The real genius of Steve Jobs’, The New Yorker, 11 Nov. 2011. 
57 Blanqui, Histoire de l’Économie Politique; Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture. 
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durability.58 A different trajectory emerges if we adopt the opposite perspective to 
Blanqui and Baines and assess the innovations of the Industrial Revolution in terms 
of the broader textile landscape of early modern Europe from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries. Judged in terms of what we might call the ‘before’ picture, 
Richard Arkwright’s macro-invention appears less a first step on the road to mass 
production, and more the outcome of a long history of applying capital-intensive, 
mechanical solutions to quality and supply problems in luxury textile manufacturing. 
 The key component in Arkwright’s machine, the drafting rollers Adolphe 
Blanqui identified as ‘two small cylinders, rotating in opposite directions’, were first 
applied to cotton spinning in the 1730s by Lewis Paul, a London-born inventor of 
textile machinery. In 1738 Paul patented a spinning machine which incorporated a 
series of rollers for feeding the fibre to the spindles. It is unlikely that labour costs for 
cotton spinning represented a powerful incentive for this invention in the 1730s, 
when imports of raw cotton were stagnant, average counts of yarn were coarse, and 
what little evidence we possess suggests piece rates were lower than the 1750s 
and 1760s. Rollers were already widely employed in England in metalworking and 
in textiles, and Paul probably derived the idea of using them in his spinning machine 
from his previous, successful invention, a pinking engine. Paul’s patent claimed his 
spinning machine spun either cotton or wool, but when it was subsequently put to 
work at Birmingham, Northampton and elsewhere, it spun almost exclusively cotton. 
Although it never achieved great success, due to unresolved technical issues, it was 
not the complete failure it has sometimes been painted. At Northampton, Marvel’s 
Mill, a purpose-built, water-powered factory, employed a hundred workers on five of 
Paul’s machines, each with fifty spindles (Fig. 26). It continued in use from 1743 
until about 1761, after Paul’s death and only eight years before Arkwright patented 
his spinning frame.59  
  
 
 
                                               
58 John James, The History of the Worsted Manufacture in England, London 1857: chapter 12; John 
Styles, ‘What were Cottons for in the Industrial Revolution?’ in Giorgio Riello and Prasannan 
Parthasarathi, eds, The Spinning World: A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200-1850, Oxford 
2009: 307-26. 
59 David L. Bates, ‘Cotton-Spinning in Northampton: Edward Cave’s Mill, 1742-1761’, 
Northamptonshire Past and Present, Vol. 9, 1996: 237-51. 
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Fig 26. Marvel’s Mill, Northampton, 1746. The mill was purpose-built 
for the water-powered cotton spinning machinery invented by Lewis 
Paul.  
 
The fact that cotton became the focus of Paul’s efforts in the 1730s, when cottons 
accounted for only a very small proportion of English textile production is significant. 
In late seventeenth and early eighteenth century England, cotton textiles were far 
from being the mass market commodities they were to become by the 1830s. Even 
in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, cotton gowns still remained semi-
luxuries, less expensive than silks but more expensive than those made from other 
fibres (Table 5). Yet already, in 1722, their popularity had resulted in the prohibition 
of colour-patterned all-cotton fabrics.  
 Lewis Paul moved to Birmingham to start work on his new machine ten years 
later, in 1732, the year the patent expired on the water-powered silk throwing 
machinery installed by Thomas Lombe in his huge factory at Derby in 1719. Silk 
(other than silk waste) is not normally spun. Instead, the long, very fine filaments of 
silk fibre are unwound from the cocoon and then twisted together to produce a 
multi-filament yarn. In Italy, Europe’s primary silk manufacturing centre before 1700, 
silk throwing was mechanized during the Middle Ages by means of the circular silk-
throwing mill. These circular mills were initially driven by hand, but water-power was 
applied in Bologna as early as 1341. In Italy the machinery employed in these mills 
went on being refined and enlarged over the next three centuries. 60 The process 
culminated during the later seventeenth century in Piedmont, in north-west Italy, 
where 125 huge, multi-story, silk-throwing mills had been built by the start of the 
eighteenth century, housing sophisticated water-powered winding and throwing 
                                               
60 Carlo Poni, ‘The Circular Silk Mill: A Factory before the Industrial Revolution in Early Modern 
Europe’, History of Technology, Vol. 21, 1999: 65-85. 
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machinery and each employing on average over fifty workers.61 The principal 
purpose of these throwing machines was to produce organzine – silk warp – which, 
like most warps, required a much higher twist to give it strength. From the mid-
seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, Piedmontese organzine was the best 
in Europe, an indispensible raw material for weaving fine silk piece goods at Lyon 
and Spitalfields, and consequently the object of bitter technological rivalry in the 
continent’s other silk manufacturing countries. 
 Silks were the pinnacle of early modern European élite fashion, the epitome 
of luxury. They were also a principal focus of capital-intensive mechanical 
innovation. From throwing mills to engine looms, stocking frames to draw looms, 
inventive effort in textiles was invested disproportionately in the machinery of silk 
manufacture, driven by mercantilist competition between the states of early modern 
Europe in this most fashionable of products.62 Thomas Lombe’s machines in his 
factory at Derby were pirated copies of the most up-to-date Piedmontese silk 
throwing equipment. That did not prevent him from being awarded a 14 year British 
patent and feted for reducing the country’s dependence on imported thrown silk. On 
the expiry of his patent in 1732, a grateful parliament awarded him the enormous 
sum of £14,000 in lieu of its extension, encouraging others to use the technology. 
The lesson for entrepreneurs about the British state’s support for mechanising 
primary processing of imported luxury raw materials could not have been clearer. 
The same year, Lewis Paul began work on his machine to make yarn from another 
imported luxury raw material – cotton. Circular, with a central drive shaft, it had 
striking similarities in design to Lombe’s Italian silk throwing mill.63  
 The financial returns Lewis Paul secured from his invention were meagre 
compared to those enjoyed by Thomas Lombe. The real return came only four 
decades later, after Paul’s death, when Richard Arkwright took Paul’s drafting 
rollers and implemented them, not on circular frames like Lombe’s Italian silk 
throwing machines, but on linear frames. He did so with more technical support, 
more determination and more sustained and skillful financial backing than Paul. The 
result was the ultimate macro-invention. It transformed cotton into a mass-market 
commodity. Yet its genealogy had a very different character. Its roots lay in the 
luxury textile industries of late Medieval and Renaissance Europe, while its 
development was driven by the commercial, colonial and mercantilist policies of the 
British state. 
                                               
61 Giuseppe Prato, La Vita Eonomica in Piemonte a Mezzo il Secolo XVIII, Turin 1908: 218. 
62 See John Styles, ‘Fashion and Innovation in Early-Modern Europe’, in Evelyn Welch, ed., 
Fashioning the Early Modern: Creativity and Innovation in Europe, 1500-1800, Oxford 2017. 
63 For the similarities between Lombe’s and Paul’s machines, see Richard L. Hills, Power in the 
Industrial Revolution, Manchester 1970: chapters 2 and 3. 
